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1. Introduction  
 One of the distinctive marks of analytic epistemol ogy is 
its treatment of scepticism about knowledge of the external 
world. If we consider the fundamental role that sce pticism had 
always played in traditional theories of knowledge,  the 
somewhat secondary role it plays in analytic episte mologies 
will surprise us. The general view within analytic circles 
maintains that knowledge is  possible, so that the only 
interesting issue is to find its conditions of poss ibility 1. 
From this perspective, the task of refuting sceptici sm does not 
appear as necessary. When scepticism is introduced in the 
discussion, it is as a useful tool to evaluate the 
insufficiencies of different theories in explaining  what 
knowledge is. Therefore, the aim is not showing that  the 
sceptic is wrong, but showing how he is wrong 2. In short, 
either silence around scepticism, or its use as a 
methodological tool are the immediate consequences of an 
extended view, according to which epistemology woul d be immune 
against the sceptical challenge. 
 This situation has changed in part during the last  years, 
when abundant works about the success or failure of  the 
different types of scepticism has appeared, and whe n the 
importance of dealing with scepticism for the succe ss of any 
theory of knowledge has been accepted 3. But notwithstanding 
the actual proliferation of research about sceptici sm in 
analytic spheres, there is an issue that has not be en properly 
dealt with yet. I mean the discussion about the rea sons why 
analytic epistemology has frequently considered sce pticism as 
harmless. I think studying the beginnings of analyt ic 
philosophy can throw some light onto this problem. It is often 
said that analytic philosophy lacks a historical pe rspective, 
even regarding itself. My essay attempts to contrib ute to the 
development of such a historical memory, by showing  the 
                         
    1 Chisholm, Roderick: Theory of Knowledge , 2ª ed. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977.  
    2 Stroud, Barry: The Significance of Philosophical 
Scepticism . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. 
 Pollock, John: Contemporary Theories of Knowledge . London: 
Hutchinson, 1987. 
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conceptual line that links the beginnings of analyt ic 
philosophy with current research about scepticism. In this 
sense, the study of the philosophical position of G . E. Moore, 
one of the fathers of analytic philosophy, illumina tes our 
understanding of the displacement of scepticism fro m its former 
central place in epistemological discussions. 
 
2. Moore's original proposal: the justification of a 
proposition only requires that there is no reason t o deny it  
 Moore's epistemological project aims at the follow ing 
objective: to show the validity of everyday or comm on sense 
beliefs against sceptical claims. Under common sens e beliefs he 
understands, for example, the belief that the Earth h as existed 
for many years; that there were and are three dimen sional 
objects, like the human body; that we are surrounde d by other 
people that feel, think and have different experien ces; and 
other such beliefs. With this problem in mind, he e xplores a 
strategy of argumentation which, in my opinion, is new in the 
history of philosophy. Such a strategy consists in saying that 
if there is no reason that justifies denying our co mmon sense 
beliefs, then we are justified in holding them. Thu s, 
throughout his writings Moore tries to find a reaso n to deny, 
for example, that there is an external world. After  various 
attempts, he arrives at the conclusion that there i s no reason 
to deny the existence of the external world. Hence,  we are 
justified in believing its existence. 
 Moore's first two articles - 'The refutation of id ealism' 
(1903) and 'The nature and reality of objects of pe rception' 
(1905-1906) - have not received the attention of many  scholars. 
In  my opinion, however, the study of those two art icles is 
vital to understand Moore's original strategy of ju stification, 
for they contain in a nutshell much of what he woul d later 
develop about scepticism. 
 In effect, a hint of Moore's original approach to the 
justification of our common sense beliefs can alrea dy be found 
in his first article 'The refutation of idealism' 4. 
 
 "The question requiring to be asked about material  
things is thus not: What reason have we for supposing 
that anything exists corresponding  our sensations? 
but: What reason have we for supposing that materia l 
things do not  exist, since their  existence has 
precisely the same evidence as that of our 
sensations?" ('The refutation of idealism', 30). 
  
He then tries to find this reason in his next artic le 'The 
nature and reality of objects of perception' 5. Where he there 
looks for a justification of our belief in the existence  of the 
world, he introduces the notion of justification in  terms of 
good reasons: 
                         
    4 Moore, George Edward.: 'The refutation of idealism ', in 
his Philosophical Studies . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1922. 
    5 Moore, G. E.: 'The nature and reality of objects o f 
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 "A good reason for a belief is a proposition which is 
true, and which would not be true unless the belief  
were also true." ('The nature and reality of object s 
of perception', 35). 
 
Hence, a proposition is a justification for a belie f if its 
truth is related to the truth of the belief. Now, w hat 
proposition can serve as a justification of the bel ief in the 
existence of the world? In this article, Moore sugg ests that 
the only way to justifiably believe in the existenc e of the 
world, is to suppose that the proposition 'There ar e sense-
contents' is true. 
 
 "If our observation gives us any reason whatever, for 
believing in the existence of other persons <and, 
hence, of the world>, we must assume the existence,  
not only of our own perceptions, thoughts and 
feelings, but also of some ... 'sense-contents'". 
('The nature and reality of objects of perception',  
79). 
 
Hence, the problem of the existence of external wor ld depends 
on whether we can affirm that the sense-data exist. But,  can we 
justifiably affirm that the sense data exist? It is  precisely 
when answering this question that Moore abandons th e 
traditional approach to justification. For Moore tr ies to 
justify the belief in the existence of the sense-da ta, not by 
finding a reason to hold it, but rather by showing that there 
are no reasons to doubt it. This new approach to ju stification 
can be seen in the following two quotes, where Moor e asks 
himself: 
 
 "Is there then any reason to think, for instance, 
that none  of the colours which I perceive as 
occupying areas of certain shapes and sizes really 
exist in the areas which they appear to occupy?" 
('The nature and reality of objects of perception',  
90) 
 
And he answers: 
 
 "I think it is plain that we have no reason to 
assert, in any case whatever, that a perceived colour 
does not  really exist in the place where it is 
perceived as being, unless  we assume that that very 
same place really is occupied by something else --
either  by some different sensible qualities or  by 
material objects such as physical science supposes to 
exist. ('The nature and reality of objects of 
perception', 95). 
 
At this point I need to make some remarks. I have i ntroduced 
Moore's discussion about sense-data only because it  is an early 
example of Moore's search for a new kind of justifi cation. But 
my focus in this paper is to show Moore's strategy of 
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specifically related to sense-data, such as why Moo re thinks 
that the existence of sense-data is a reason for th e existence 
of the world, or whether his argument against denyi ng the 
existence of sense-data can be accepted.   
 Thus, we have seen how Moore does not want to confirm that 
the sense-contents do exist, but to analyse whether it is 
sensible to suppose that they do not exist. Through  this 
strategy, Moore tries to hold the existence of the world 
indirectly: if we lack grounds to justifiably deny its 
existence, that is, if we lack grounds to doubt it, then we  are 
justified to affirm it. In other words, only if the re are 
reasons to doubt the existence of external reality does it 
makes sense to doubt it. And unless we give these r easons, our 
daily beliefs will not be threatened. With this appro ach, Moore 
leaves the burden of proof to the sceptic who denie s that our 
beliefs in the existence of the world are justified . 
 
3. The thesis of the degrees of certainty  
 The above strategy of justification for common sen se 
beliefs is intimately linked to Moore's defense of what I will 
call the 'thesis of the degrees of certainty'. This  thesis 
highlight that our beliefs present us with different  degrees of 
certainty, and holds that their justification depen ds on the 
degree of certainty that accompanies them. As a conse quence, if 
a certain belief presents us with a higher degree o f certainty 
than another belief, then we will be justified in h olding the 
former.  
 The thesis of the degrees of certainty has an imme diate 
application to the sceptical debate. Thus, a pervasi ve claim in 
Moore's writings is his insistence that we are less  certain of 
sceptical argumentations than of non-sceptical clai ms. In other 
words, we are more certain of our daily beliefs tha n of any 
doubt about them 6. According to this thesis, it is not 
necessary to state that our belief in the existence  of the 
world is certain, but it is only necessary to show that such a 
belief has a higher degree of certainty than scepti cal doubts. 
Examples of the thesis of the degrees of certainty can be  found 
throughout Moore's writings. I have chosen one that  appears in 
his article 'Some judgements of perception' (1918-1 919). 
  
 "This, after all, you know, really is a finger: there 
is no doubt about it: I know it, and you all know it. 
And I think we may safely challenge any philosopher  
to bring forward any argument in favour either of the 
proposition that we do not know it, or of the 
proposition that it is not true, which does not at 
some point, rest upon some premiss which is, beyond  
comparison, less certain than is the proposition 
                         
    6 Moore, G. E.: 'Hume's philosophy' and 'Some judgem ents of 
perception', in his Philosophical Studies ,  ib . 
 Moore, G. E.: Some Main Problems of Philosophy . Georg 
Allen & Unwin, 1953. 
 Moore, G. E.: 'Proof of an external world' and 'Four forms 
of scepticism' in his Philosophical Papers . London: Georg Allen 
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which is designed to attack. The questions whether we 
do ever know such things as these, and whether ther e 
are any material things, seem to me, therefore, to be 
questions which there is no need to take seriously:  
they are questions which it is quite easy to answer , 
with certainty, in the affirmative." ('Some 
judgements of perception', 228). 
 
4. Moore's rejection of scepticism  
 From that strategy of justification and from the thesis of  
the degrees of certainty, Moore derives the followi ng 
conclusion: we do not have reasons to doubt our eve ryday 
beliefs. Hence, we are justified in holding them. S cepticism 
should not worry us. 
 A further consequence of this kind of argumentatio n is 
Moore's assertion that our everyday beliefs do not need any 
proof, and correspondingly, that no philosophical a rgument can 
take away their validity. This view appears, for ex ample, in 
his article 'Hume`s philosophy' (1909). 
 
 "The only proof that we do know external facts lie s 
in the simple fact that we do know them. And the 
sceptic can, with perfect internal consistency, den y 
that he does know any. But it can, I think, be show n 
that he has no reason for denying it. And in 
particular it may, I think, be easily seen that the  
arguments which Hume uses in favour of this positio n 
have no conclusive force. 
  To begin with, his arguments ... depend upon two 
general assumptions. ... And both of these 
assumptions may, of course, be denied. It is just a s 
easy to deny them, as to deny that I do know any 
external facts. And if these two assumptions did 
really lead to the conclusion that I cannot know any, 
it would, I think, be proper to deny them: we might  
fairly regard the fact that they led to this absurd  
conclusion as disproving them." ('Hume's philosophy', 
160). 
 
As Moore says three pages after: 
 
 "It would always be at least as easy to deny the 
argument as to deny that we do know external facts. " 
('Hume's philosophy', 163).   
 
Moore's strategy is, clearly, a reductio ad absurdum  of 
scepticism. Thus, if the sceptical argument conclud es that this 
hand does not exist, then something is wrong with t he argument.  
 We can now appreciate an important development in Moore's 
approach to justification. In effect, at this point  of his 
philosophical career he no longer analyses whether  our everyday 
beliefs are justified, but affirms that they are . In this 
sense, the two last articles mentioned, namely, 'Hu me's 
philosophy' and 'Some judgements of perception', in troduce an 
important theoretical change in relation to the ear lier article 
mentioned above, 'The nature and reality of objects  of 
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theoretical conclusions from his own philosophical research. 
 
5. Criticisms  
 As expected, Moore's approach gave birth to numero us 
criticisms. A feature common to many of them is the  opinion 
that Moore's position was a naive, and therefore, a  non-
philosophical way of getting rid of scepticism 7. However, I 
think that such an interpretation of his epistemolo gy must be 
re-examined for the following reasons. 
 First, it is not true that Moore introduces either  the 
strategy of justification mentioned above or the th esis of the 
degrees of certainty ad hoc  to get rid of scepticism, and that 
he therefore begs the question. On the contrary, Moore  gives us 
reasons to defend those approaches as the only way that either 
the epistemologist, or someone who is not an expert  in 
philosophical issues, has to justify their everyday  beliefs. I 
have shown before how these reasons appear in one o f his first 
articles, namely, in 'The nature and reality of obj ects of 
perception'. I sustain that Moore's confidence in t he 
usefulness of both elements to refute scepticism is no t ad hoc , 
but the result of previous philosophical analysis w here he had 
shown that other strategies of justification inevit ably failed.  
 Second, I think Moore's position cannot be judged as naive  
since he realized, either explicitly or implicitly,  its 
limitations. Towards the end of his career, and esp ecially in 
the last article he published in life, 'Certainty' (1941/1959) 
8, he recognized two of the difficulties that his po sition 
raised. 
 The first difficulty is the lack of a metacriterio n to 
evaluate the criterion based on the degree of certa inty that 
accompanies our beliefs. Without such a metacriteri on, Moore 
would need to accept that it is possible to distinguish  beliefs 
which are knowledge from those which are not knowle dge by 
introspection and without argumentation. This kind of 
internalism faces, obviously, numerous problems. Mo ore was 
conscious of the difficulties which he expressed dr awing a 
distinction between subjective and objective certai nty. 
 
 "There is, therefore, a clear difference in meanin g 
between 'I feel certain that ...' on the one hand, 
and 'I know for certain that ...' or 'It is certain  
that ...' on the other. ('Certainty', 239). 
 
 The second difficulty Moore mentioned is the impossibi lity 
of dealing successfully with the dream-hypothesis. It is worth 
mentioning that in 'Certainty', as well as in his f ormer 
                         
    7 Clarke, Thomas: 'The legacy of skepticism', The Journal 
of Philosophy 69 , 1972. 
 Burnyeat, Myles: 'Examples in epistemology: Socrat es, 
Theaetetus and Moore', Philosophy 52 , 1977. 
 Stroud, Barry: The Significance of Philosophical 
Skepticism . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. 
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article 'Four forms of scepticism' (1940-44/1959) 9, Moore 
worked hard to refute the validity of using the dre am-
hypothesis to conclude the impossibility of knowled ge about the 
external world. His arguments are very interesting,  and deserve 
a more detailed study than the one I am able to dev ote here. 
These considerations notwithstanding, it cannot be forgotten 
that Moore's last claim is the recognition that, unf ortunately, 
the dream-hypothesis leaves the door open to scepti cism. 
 
 "I cannot see my way to deny that it is logically 
possible that all the sensory experiences I am having 
now should be mere dream-images. And if this is 
logically possible, and if further the sensory 
experiences I am having now were the only experiences 
I am having, I do not see how I could possibly know  
for certain that I am not dreaming." ('Certainty', 
250). 
 
 It might be precisely because Moore recognized the se 
difficulties that he did not draw in its entirety t he 
theoretical conclusions that could be derived from his 
position. On the one hand, Moore thought that the s trategy of 
justification, which consists in pointing out the l ack of 
reasons for doubting, and the thesis of the degrees  of 
certainty were not only adequate, but the only way to achieve 
justification. But, on the other hand, he was alway s reluctant 
to accept those strategies once and for all. In eff ect, 
throughout his writings Moore also explored more cl assical 
strategies of justification, where he tried to find r easons for 
believing  justifiably that there is an external world. This 
fact led to contrasting claims, and explains why in  'A defence 
of common sense' Moore sustained that it was not ne cessary to 
prove that the point of view of common sense was ad equate, 
whereas in 'Proof of an external world' he felt obl iged to 
offer proof of the world's existence. 
 
6. Appraisal.  
 It is incompatible to claim that there are no reas ons to 
doubt our daily beliefs about the world with other claims that 
try to prove the existence of an external world or to refute 
scepticism. Such movement in two directions is one of Moore's 
weakest points. In my opinion, Moore's project has strength as 
long as he sticks to his original intuition. But, as soon a s he 
forgets that which gives his approach its originali ty and 
novelty, that is, the strategy of justification men tioned above 
and the thesis of the degrees of certainty, he is u nable to 
shut the door to scepticism. 
 Despite his ultimate failure, I think Moore's atte mpt to 
vindicate the validity of our everyday beliefs deser ves all our 
respect 10. He belongs to a tradition of thought, one of whos e 
                         
    9 Moore, G. E.: 'Four forms of scepticism', in his 
Philosophical Papers , ib . 
    10 In this regard, I agree with some scholars who hav e 
recently stressed Moore's importance: 
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biggest exponents is Hume, which recognizes the exi stence of a 
clash between the justification of our beliefs in eve ryday life 
and the justification of our beliefs in philosophic al life. 
Moore remained determined to value everyday beliefs  above the 
sceptical conclusions of certain philosophical atti tudes, 
despite the distinct difficulties he encountered. T his is 
precisely Moore's more impressive feature: he never  abandoned 
his everyday 'I' when philosophizing. In this sense , the label 
of 'philosopher of common sense', frequently used t o refer to 
him, is actually a compliment. 
 Moore inaugurates a new path in contemporary epist emology 
11. His importance rests in understanding that the ha bitual 
strategy of looking for an apodictic justification of our 
beliefs through the search for a reason to support them, does 
not lead us very far. He was the first analytic phi losopher to 
realize that the only way to defeat scepticism is t o approach 
it from a new perspective. It is a perspective that  finds a 
firm ground in daily beliefs and builds from them a  theory of 
knowledge with deeply anti-sceptical features. Moor e's 
epistemological position presented enormous advanta ges. Taking 
everyday beliefs as inviolable, prevents the episte mologist 
from falling into a pyrrhonic trap. We do not need to argue  the 
confidence we have in our beliefs. We know that the  world 
exists, and we do not need to prove it. Our only wo rry should 
be to understand what knowledge is, not whether it is po ssible. 






- Important difference between 'The refutation of i dealism' and 
'The nature and reality of objects of perception':  
 In the first article Moore does not introduce the 
existence of sense-data as a hypothesis (according to Miguel), 
while in the second article he does.  
 The explanation of this fact would requiere an analysis of  
the conclusions that Moore draws from 'The refutati on of 
idealism'. 
 
- Important difference between 'The refutation of i dealism' and 
other posterior articles: In the former article Moo re does not 
consider scepticism as absurd, and thinks that scep ticism 
cannot be refuted until we find reasons for accepti ng the 
existence of material objects. Hence, he tries to f ind these 
reasons in 'The nature and reality of objects of pe rception' 
and in other posterior articles.  
 
                                                                
Bell, D. and Cooper, N. (eds.): The Analytic Tradition.--
Meaning, Thought and Knowledge . Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990. 
 Stroll, Avrum: Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty . 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
    11 The Scottish philosopher Reid and the Spanish Balm es had 
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- The fact that Moore is an intuitionist in ethics fits into 
his general defence of the thesis of the degrees of  certainty 
and of the common sense in epistemology. 
 The problem every intuitionist faces is to determi ne 
whether or not an intuition is adequate, that is, t o 
distinguish true judgments about perception from fa lse ones. An 
intuitionist sustains that there is no criterion to  determine 
whether or not certain properties are present. Eith er you see 
that the object posseses certain properties or you do not see 
it. The consequence is the impossibility of avoidin g 
disagreement in epistemological discussions as well  as in 
cotidian discussions. 
 
- Moore is not a pragmatist, but there is a way to develop his 
ideas that leads to pragmatism. On the other hand, there is 
Moore's influence on Wittgenstein's 'On certainty'.  
 
- Moore's study can help to indicate the path that needs to be 
follow to answer the dominant view within contempor ary 
philosophy where relativism, probabilism and anti-r ealism (and 
all of them allow for sceptical conclusions) are in  fashion.  
 
- Common sense beliefs are not propositions about "re lations of 
ideas" but about "matters of fact" (following Hume' s 
denomination). 
 
- Since 'The refutation of idealism' one of Moore's  unresolved 
problems had been sensorial illusions. 
 
- Moore neutralizes the effects of sceptical argume ntations. 
Because he knows he is standing up, he knows he is not 
dreaming. The burden of proof is left to the scepti c. 
 Moore does not follow the sceptic's game, because he 
refuses to say how he knows. He knows that he knows, even if h e 
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